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ABSTRACT
This article outlines the origins, development and historical dynamics of Arabs in 
Indonesia and discusses responses of Indonesians, particularly Muslims, towards 
this group. It sketches a variety of Indonesia's Arabs—sadah and non-sadah alike—
and their contributions to the shape of Indonesian Islam, Islamic cultures and 
Muslim politics. It also traces the roots of—and depicts the historical dynamics and 
changes—social relations and interactions between Arabs and local populations. 
The relations between Arabs and non-Arabs in the country have always been marked 
with conflict and tensions on the one hand, and peace and cooperation on the other. 
Some Muslims in the country "have admired" and built a strong relationship with 
the Arabs and "Indo-Arabs" while others have denounced them as the destroyers 
of Indonesia's local traditions, civic pluralism, social stability and interreligious 
tolerance. This article tries to portray this paradox, discuss factors contributing to 
the damaging image of Arabs in contemporary Indonesia, and explain the rationales 
behind it. Lastly, it discusses prospects and the possibilities of the constructive 
relationships between Arabs, Indo-Arabs, and other nationals, social groupings, 
and ethnicities in the country.
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INTRODUCTION
During the last decades, particularly since the downfall of the New Order 
authoritarian rule in 1998 Indonesia has witnessed an unprecedented upsurge 
in religious ritual, association, and observance that defies a "century of 
forecasts by secularisation and modernisation theorists of religion's immanent 
privatisation and decline" (Hefner 2010: 1031–1047). After the collapse of New 
Order regime of the late President Suharto (1921–2008), Indonesia, like other 
nations in Southeast Asia, has experienced a dramatic religious revitalisation, 
typified by, among other phenomena, the rise of piety industries, macrocosm-
minded Islam, and transnational religious movements. Extremist terrorist-
jihadist groups, Arab-inspired Salafi conservatives, the Indian-type Tablighi 
Jamaat piety movement, Hizbut Tahrir internationalists, and Muslim Brothers 
have moved rapidly across the region.1 Besides the Islamist resurgence, 
contemporary Indonesia has also been marked by a series of seemingly 
religiously inspired intra-group conflicts such as, clashes between Muslim 
hardliners and Muslim minorities (e.g., Ahmadis, Shiites and followers of 
various indigenous sects of Islam), as well as Muslim-non-Muslim tensions. 
One of particularly significant features of the post-New Order Indonesian 
Islamist movement has been the appearance of Arabs and Indonesians of Arab 
descent (Indo-Arabs) that act as extremist leaders and conservative clerics in 
both Indonesian politics and public Islam. I will explain later how these clerics 
and leaders have contributed to shaping a negative image of Indonesia's Arab 
groups and of anything related to Arab cultures, despite the fact that contemporary 
Arabs and Indo-Arabs have made innumerable positive contributions to the 
country. More importantly, these extremists' and conservatives' intolerant and 
violent acts have obscured the history and vital contributions of other Arab 
and Indo-Arab ulama (Islamic scholars) and leaders in shaping Indonesian 
Muslim culture, education, economy and politics. It is true that ever since their 
arrival in the archipelago, Arab communities have played productive roles 
in shaping Indonesian Islam, Muslim cultures, and Islamic schooling, among 
others, ensuring that historically Indonesian Muslims have generally given 
high respect to this group. 
Unfortunately, however, in recent years, relations between Indonesian 
Muslims and Arabs have shifted from being positive to being slightly negative. 
Several factors that contributed to this changing nature of Arab relations with 
the rest of Indonesian society include the following: (1) the involvement 
of some Arab and Indo-Arab leaders in violence; (2) the practice of kawin 
kontrak (temporary marriage) between Arab men and local women and the 
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phenomenon of sex tourism; (3) the news of ill-treatment of Indonesian 
domestic workers and housemaids by Arab employers in the Middle East; 
(4) vulgar Islamisation and "Arabisation," and; (5) the ongoing intergroup 
violence and terrorism in some Arab countries.  
These factors have generated fears, tensions and animosities in the 
Indonesian populace, against Indonesia's Arabs and Indo-Arabs, as well as 
against some forms of Arab Islam. Some groups use social media such as 
Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp, or mailing lists for their campaigns, while 
others create a variety of websites to disseminate anti-Arab news, information 
and articles. The anti-Arab groups usually use particular words such as onta 
(camel) or Arab bahlul (stupid Arabs) to express their feelings, angers and 
disagreement with the Arabs or Indo-Arabs. It should be noted, however, that 
anti-Arab and anti-Arab Islam actions are not a new phenomenon in Indonesian 
history. Long before Indonesia gained its independence in 1945, such acts had 
already taken place. Narratives deriding Arabs and Arab Islam, for instance, 
can be found in the Javanese collection of classical texts Serat Centhini 
(also known as Suluk Tambanglaras or Suluk Tambanglaras-Amangraga), 
composed at the Surakarta Court and published in 1814, as well as Serat 
Darmogandul and Serat Gatoloco, all of which represent opposition against 
Arabs and Arab Islam in Java, while favouring local Javanese religious and 
cultural practices.   
This article does not intend to suggest that all Indonesians and Muslims 
lack respect for Indonesia's Arabs and Indo-Arabs, or that all Indonesian 
Muslims refuse any form of Arab Islam. In fact, many Indonesian Muslims 
nowadays admire and practice Arab Islam by adopting Islamic practices, 
customs and discourses developed in the Arab world, and by wearing traditional 
Arab dress such as the thawb, jalabiyah, or even niqab. Some Indonesian 
Muslims have come to believe that forms of Arab Islam are more Islamic and 
purer than those of Indonesian Islam. 
Equally important, this article does not argue that all Arabs or Indo-Arabs 
have contributed to the destructive images of their particular communities, 
or of Islam and Muslims in general. Many Arabs and Indo-Arab leaders 
nowadays still play an enormous constructive role in forming the country's 
civic cultures, civilised politics, tolerant Islam, and civil education. Nor does 
this article argue that other Indonesians have no responsibility for any of the 
post-New Order collective violence and intolerance in the country. In fact, 
many perpetrators of ferocious anti-pluralist campaigns in the country have 
been non-Arab Indonesians who have been shaped and influenced by particular 
forms of Islamic schools, narratives, discourses and teachings. 
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This article addresses these crucial, changing issues, and discusses 
how contemporary Indonesians have responded to Arabs and their cultural 
heritage. However, before explaining contemporary shifts and developments 
among Indonesian Muslims and citizens towards Arabs and Indo-Arabs in 
the country, it is helpful to describe the genesis and history of Arabs in the 
archipelago and their roles in Indonesian society, in order to understand the 
trajectory and changes of this community.
THE ORIGINS OF INDO-ARABS IN INDONESIA
Along with Chinese Indonesians, the Indo-Arabs comprise one of the two most 
significant "foreign" groups in Indonesia. After the Chinese, they compose the 
second largest Oriental minority in the country. Like the Chinese, they reside 
throughout Indonesia, from Aceh at the northern end of Sumatra Island in the 
west, to Papua in the most eastern area of the archipelago. Over the centuries, 
they, like the Chinese, have managed to find for themselves a unique and in 
many ways indispensable place in the society of the archipelago, especially 
in relation to Indonesia's cultural, religious, political and economic spheres. 
The Arabs, again like the Chinese, settled in coastal areas of today's Indonesia 
long before the European colonisers—primarily Portuguese and Dutch— first 
landed in the archipelago in the 16th century. After the arrival of the Portuguese 
and later the Dutch, the numbers of Arab immigrants gradually decreased, and 
then rose again after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 (de Jonge 1997; 
Boxberger 2002). 
Since most, if not all, Arab travellers in the past centuries were men, 
they married local women (some of local nobility), thereby creating a new 
population known as "Indo-Arabs" (Arab Indonesians or Indonesian Arabs) 
or "Arab peranakan." These terms refer to Indonesian citizens of Arab descent 
born or raised in this archipelagic country. In Arabic, they are called muwallad, 
in contrast with wulayati, a term that describes those who have no mixed blood. 
Moreover, the presence of Kampung Arab (Arab districts) and the presence 
of Arab communities in major towns in Sumatra, Java, Moluccas, Sulawesi, 
Lombok and Kalimantan, among others, indicates their prolonged existence, 
as well as the prevalence of inter-marriage with other ethnicities. 
The presence of Hadrami Arab immigrants in Southeast Asia has 
attracted the attention of some scholars, including van den Berg (1886, 1989), 
van der Kroef (1953, 1954, 1955), Reid (1972), Winstedt (1918), Azra (1992), 
de Jonge (1997), Freitag (2003), Ho (2006), and Jacobson (2009), among 
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many others. Some studies have simply been travel accounts, such as those 
by van der Meulen (1947), van der Meulen and von Wissmann (1932), and 
Stark (1940), while others, such as those by van den Berg (1886) and Ingrams 
(1937), were motivated by the socio-political interests of European colonial 
governments, particularly the Dutch and British.2 More recently, the 1990s 
witnessed an upsurge of academic interest in Hadrami migration and diaspora 
(Heiss and Slama 2010). Arai (2004: 3) has argued that there are at least two 
factors that influenced an abrupt increase of studies on the Hadrami Arab 
communities in Indonesia and Southeast Asia, namely: (1) the unification 
of Yemen in 1990; and (2) the blossoming of diaspora studies as a field in 
anthropology and cultural studies. 
As discussed by such noted historians of Southeast Asia as Vlekke 
(1943), Azra (1992), Reid (1992), Ricklefs (1993), Lombard (1996), de Jonge 
and Kaptein (2002), Jacobson (2009), and Laffan (2011), the Indonesian-Malay 
archipelago has had been in contact with the Arab world for hundreds of years, 
long before the advent of Islam in Indonesia. While Arabs were travelling to 
the Malay world long before European colonisers landed in the region, and 
the first Arab settlements in the archipelago may date from the fifth century, 
Hadrami first came to this area in significant numbers much later, probably 
in the 15th century, during the period of the Islamic Sultanate of Malacca 
(located in today's Malaysia).
L.W.C. van den Berg (1845–1927), a Dutch scholar in the Dutch colonial 
era famous for his research on Arab Indonesians of Hadrami descent, noted 
that the Arabs began to come to the Indies (present-day Indonesia) in large 
groups in the late 18th century. At first, they settled in Aceh, then Palembang 
in South Sumatra, and Pontianak in West Kalimantan. These groups started 
residing in Java in the 1820s, and by the 1870s, there were Arabs arriving to 
settle in eastern areas of the archipelago as well. Van den Berg (1989: 72–77) 
also noted that Palembang and Aceh remained the main Arab communities 
in Sumatra, because, in the early 19th century, Sultan Mahmud Badr al-Din 
of Palembang provided space for Arab communities to settle in his territory, 
signifying the harmonious relationship between the local populations and the 
Arabs. 
Steamship technology in the 19th century and the opening of the Suez 
Canal in 1869 were instrumental in further stimulating Arab migration and 
travel to the region. The opening of the Suez Canal meant that ships could 
travel between Europe and South Asia without navigating around Africa, 
thereby reducing the distance of a sea voyage between Europe and Asia. At the 
time, most contact between Southeast Asia and the Arab world was through 
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trade, primarily of spice, although some teachers and preachers also engaged 
in cultural and religious exchanges. In the second half of the 19th century and 
the first half of the 20th century, Hadrami Arabs composed the great majority 
of Arab immigrants to what is now Indonesia. The second largest Arab group 
came from Hijaz, in today's western Saudi, even though their numbers paled 
in comparison to those of the Hadramis (Ho 2006; Tagliacozzo 2014).   
Sumatra in particular had long been a site of transit for foreign traders 
and travellers. By the 1300s, river ports along the Straits of Melaka in northern 
Sumatra served as stopovers for ships from India, Central Asia, and the Middle 
East. Perhaps it was only in the Batak region where Islam was introduced 
later. The early coastal Arab and Muslim presence in the island had little direct 
impact on most Batak peoples. Moreover, Islam was introduced in Batak areas 
mostly during the 1820s and 1830s, when the Padris, the Saudi-influenced 
Muslim reformists, moved north from West Sumatra into the southern areas of 
the Batak, making large-scale conversions of local believers to Islamic faith in 
that area (Ooi 2004: 224–225). 
Other Arab and Indo-Arab groups in the Malay-Indonesian archipelago 
are descendants of the great preacher of Hadrami origins Shaikh Jamaluddin 
Akbar al-Husaini, more widely known as Shaikh Maulana Husain Jumadil 
Kubro, or simply Jumadil Kubro, who was believed to be a descendent of 
Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), through Husain bin Ali. Van Bruinessen 
(1994) states that, the different opinions about the origins of Jumadil Kubro 
notwithstanding, it is commonly agreed that most Muslim preachers and 
Islamic missionaries in Java and other islands in the 15th and 16th centuries, 
including some of the Walisongo, the "Nine Saints," who are considered to 
have been the first Islamic "agents," or missionaries that introduced and spread 
Islam in Java, were the descendants of Shaikh Jumadil Kubro. 
Moreover, van Bruinessen (1994: 320–321) and Djajadiningrat (1983) 
note that, according to the early 19th-century chronicle Babad Cirebon, Jumadil 
Kubro is regarded as the ancestor of some great Javanese saints, including 
Sunan Gunung Djati, Sunan Bonang, Sunan Ampel and Sunan Kalijaga. 
Furthermore, a Javanese chronicle from Gresik (East Java) mentions Jumadil 
Kubro as the grandfather of Sunan Giri, another noted Javanese saint, as well 
as a blood relation with Sunan Ampel of Surabaya. Two chronicles from West 
Java, Sajarah Banten and Babad Pajajaran, also mention Jumadil Kubro as a 
major figure who was a blood relative to some Javanese saints.
Another category of Indo-Arabs in what is now Indonesia was the 
offspring of the Ba 'Alawi family,3 who take the name 'Alawi from a grandson 
of Ahmad bin Isa al-Muhajir (873–956), the 10th descendant of the Prophet 
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Muhammad (PBUH).4 This group, widely known as sadah (singular as sayyid) 
or, more precisely, as the Ba 'Alawi sadah group, played a central role in the 
spread of Islam, not only in Indonesia, but also in other areas of Southeast Asia 
(Singapore, Malaysia and Brunei, among others), India, and Africa, particularly 
Tanzania, Somalia, Kenya, and Comoros (Ho 2006; Al-Mansyur 2010). The 
progeny of Ahmad bin Isa al-Muhajir formed multiple families of Hadrami 
Arabs, whose family names are well known throughout the region, including 
Alatas, Aljunied, Alhadad, Alkaaf, Assagaf, Shihab, Alydrus, Alhabshi, Aljufri 
and others. Since the sadah group is considered descendants of the Prophet 
Muhammad (PBUH), they receive privileges and special treatment and are 
sometimes treated as holy men from some Indonesian Muslims. Moreover, 
many of the early sadah migrants, who were mostly males, were employed 
by local kings as respected teachers, judges, or advisors to the royalties or 
sultanates, and many married into royal families (Aljunied 2013; Arai 2004). 
The Irshadi, or non-sadah community, is another Arab group in the 
archipelago. As more Arab migrants reached Indonesia in the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries, the Arab population became more diverse, and began 
including non-sadah families, who were widely known as shaikh but called 
themselves "Irshadi." During the colonial period, the 'Alawi and Irshadi groups 
were involved in tensions and conflict over the status of sadah and other socio-
religious-political issues (Freitag and Clarence-Smith 1997). 
It is important to note that, although Arabs had been travelling to today's 
Indonesia since long before Europeans landed in the 16th and 17th centuries, 
it was only in the 19th century that Arabs migrated to the archipelago in 
large groups. In 1860, the Netherlands East Indies government recorded 
8,900 registered Arab inhabitants, 6,133 of whom lived in Java and Madura. 
By 1885, the populations of both Arabs and Indo-Arabs in Southeast Asia 
increased significantly: more than 20,000 were registered in Dutch territories 
(10,888 in Java Island and Madura) and 9,613 (outside Java, including in 
Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Lombok, and Maluku), and another 529 in 
British Singapore and Melaka (van den Berg 1989). Between 1870 and 1900, 
the population was stable at about 27,000, but by 1920, the Arab population 
increased to 45,000, and by 1930, the number was at 71,355, with 41,730 in 
Java and Madura. As a result of continued immigration, the number of Arabs 
would have been 80,000 by the time of the Japanese occupation (de Jonge 
1997: 94–95). In response to the expansion of the Arab population, the Dutch 
colonial rule created special districts for them, known as Kampung Arab. 
These districts were implemented in such major cities as Jakarta, Pekalongan, 
Semarang, Surabaya, Solo, Palembang and Pontianak, among many others (de 
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Jonge 1997; van den Berg 1989; Jacobson 2009). The creation of Kampung 
Arab made it easier for the Dutch to control and oversee Arab activities.
THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF ARABS AND INDO-ARABS TO 
INDONESIAN RELIGION AND SOCIETY
Numerous Arab and Indo-Arab figures, including political leaders, educators, 
preachers and Islamic scholars, have contributed to shape Indonesia's Islamic 
and Muslim cultures. Some of these individuals will be briefly highlighted 
here, in order to emphasise the role of Arabs and Indo-Arabs, particularly 
from the sadah groups, in the spread of Islam in the country (Shahab 2009). 
Even though the sadah are highly esteemed, the graves of prominent Arabs are 
often venerated, and some Arabs feel themselves superior to local Muslims, 
they were not the only actors in the Islamisation of Indonesia. Indigenous 
Muslim leaders, preachers, teachers, clerics and hajj pilgrims were also active 
agents of the spread and entrenchment of Islam. Chinese Muslims also played 
a vital role in the introduction and spread of Islam in Indonesia, particularly 
before European colonial powers took hold in the area (Al Qurtuby 2003).
The eminent Indo-Arab ulama (Hadrami included)—past and present—
who contributed to the shaping of Indonesian Islam and Muslim cultures 
include, among others, Sayyid Husain bin Abu Bakar al-Aydarus, Abdurrahman 
bin Mustafa al-'Aydarus, Habib Ali bin Abdurrahman al-Habsy, Shaikh Salim 
bin Abdullah Ba Sumayr, Sayyid Uthman bin Abdullah al-Alawy al-Husayni, 
Habib Ahmad bin Hamzah al-Attas, Shaikh Sa'id bin Salim Na'um, Shaikh 
Abdullah Arfan Baraja, and Habib Salim Djindan (Mauladawilah 2009, 2010; 
de Jonge and Kaptein 2002; Al Gadri 1988; Azra 1997; Aziz 2002; Ellisa 
2007). Due to limited space, this article will only briefly highlight a few of the 
contributions of these religious scholars. 
Habib Husain bin Abu Bakar al-'Aydarus was a respected scholar, 
an energetic preacher, an influential religious leader, and an ascetic mystic 
who contributed significantly to the development of Islam in Jakarta and its 
surroundings (Pemda DKI 1982; Murti 2016). It is unclear when he was born, 
but he reportedly died in 1756 and was buried in the region of Luar Batang in 
today's Jakarta, and thereby became widely known as the Saint of Luar Batang 
(De Jonge and Kaptein 2002: 185). His graveyard is close to a mosque he 
built. Pilgrims continue to visit his shrine to conduct prayers, give alms and 
perform rituals for "rewards," which are usually dedicated to the deceased, 
as well as the Saint's blessings and mercy, so that their future lives may be 
successful and safe (Gilsenan 2003: 7–11). 
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Other noted figures were Habib Ahmad bin Muhammad bin Hamzah 
al-Attas (or Habib Ahmad bin Hamzah for short), who founded the Zawiyah 
Mosque in Pekojan, Jakarta, and Habib Usman bin Abdullah bin Yahya 
(Haryono 2015: 176–178). Born in Du'an al-Ayman, Yemen, Habib Ahmad 
bin Hamzah visited Mecca for hajj and umrah, and continued his journey to 
Java, the Indonesian archipelago, staying at Pare-Pare (Sulawesi), Sumenep 
(Madura), and finally Betawi (today's Jakarta), where he then chose to live in 
Pekojan and build the mosque known as Zawiyah bin Hamzah or the "Corner 
of bin Hamzah"5 in 1877. During his lifetime, he used this mosque as a centre 
for teaching and learning, introducing some classical Islamic books, such as 
Fathul Mu'in, one of the main books on fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) in the 
Shafii school of thought. Still today, this book is widely used at pesantren 
(traditional Islamic boarding schools) across Indonesia. Since the death of 
Habib Ahmad bin Hamzah, the mosque has been used by the al-Attas family 
and other habaib (singular habib) groups for family gatherings, particularly 
during Eid al-Fitr (Idul Fitri) and Eid al-Adha (Idul Adha) (al-Mansyur 2010; 
Fadli 2011). 
Shaikh Salim bin Abdullah bin Sa'ad bin Sumair al-Hadrami (d. 1855) 
was another noted Arab figure. He was a brilliant scholar and a great educator. 
Born in Hadramaut, he lived and died in Jakarta. The author of Safinatun Naja, 
a renowned classic guide to Islamic law that has been used in Indonesian-
Malay's traditional Islamic boarding schools, he was both a Sufi mystic and 
a specialist in Islamic jurisprudence of the Shafii school. Shaikh Salim was 
not only an avid Islamic scholar but also a passionate anti-colonial activist. 
At the same time that he taught Islamic sciences and knowledge and preached 
Islamic teachings, he also encouraged Muslims not to "enslave" themselves 
to political rulers and colonisers. Shaikh Salim ardently criticised religious 
figures who worked with bureaucrats and colonial governments to gain 
material advantages and political-economic interests (Mauladawilah 2010; 
Fadli 2011; Munir 2013). 
In contrast to Shaikh Salim, who strongly opposed the Dutch colonial 
rule, Sayyid Uthman bin Abdullah bin 'Aqil bin Yahya al-'Alawi al-Hussaini 
(or Sayyid Uthman for short) (born in Pekojan, Batavia, 1822) built friendship 
and partnership with the colonisers (Azra 1997; Aziz 2002; Al Gadri 1988). 
In 1889, following the recommendation of Snouck Hurgronje, the Dutch 
appointed him "Honorary Advisor for Arabian Affairs." Due to this position 
and his closeness to the Dutch, he was widely accused of being a Dutch spy and 
even of betraying Islam for his own political agenda and material interests. His 
accomodationist political stance forced him to make certain sacrifices to his 
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political-religious identity, such as granting permission to the Dutch to appoint 
Muslim judges and issuing rulings prohibiting Muslims from criticising or 
waging war against the Dutch.6 Sayyid Uthman also warned that any Muslim 
involved in the wars against the Dutch would be subject to severe penalties at 
the hands of the authorities (Azra 1997: 253–254; cf. Noupal 2013).
Another noted Arab figure in the past was Shaikh Said bin Salim Na'um 
(known Shaikh Said Na'um). The Said Na'um Mosque and School in Tanah 
Abang of Jakarta are attributed to this legendary figure. He was buried in Tanah 
Abang at a special cemetery for sadah families, including non-Arab (Malay) 
wives. In this graveyard, the graves of Shaikh Salim bin Abdullah bin Sumair, 
Habib Muhammad bin Abu Bakar Aidid, Habib Ahmad bin Alwi al-Masyhur, 
and Habib Usman bin Abdullah bin Yahya, among many others, can be also 
found. During his life, Shaikh Said Na'um established several mosques in 
Jakarta, including the famous one in Pekojan, named Langgar Tinggi (built in 
1833), which was used to conduct a variety of ritual ceremonies and religious 
activities (besides regular prayers), in accordance with the Islamic traditions 
and cultures of Tarim of Hadramaut, the place where the sadah group originated 
(Lohanda 2007; Mauladawilah 2010; Haryono 2015; Ho 2006). 
Last but not the least, Habib Ali bin Abdurrahman al-Habsyi (or Habib 
Ali Kwitang for short) (1870–1968), was a respected Islamic scholar, cleric 
and preacher in the 20th century. Born in Jakarta, Habib Ali Kwitang was the 
founder of the Islamic Center of Indonesia and the Majelis Taklim Kwitang, 
a forum for discussion, instruction and preaching concerning socio-religious 
matters, which he started in 1911 in the district of Kwitang, Central Jakarta. 
He not only gave religious sermons and taught Muslim students, but also wrote 
books. In 1918, he expanded an existing mosque in Kwitang, named Al-Riyadh 
Mushalla, and built an Islamic school, Madrasah Unwanul Falah, next to the 
mosque. Many Islamic scholars from Jakarta and across the country (and even 
from Singapore and Malaysia) received training in this madrasah and went on 
to establish Majelis Taklim (Islamic centres) in their regions. Habib Ali played 
an important role in the founding of al-Rabithah al-Alawiyyah in 1928 and its 
sub-organisation al-Maktab al-Daimi in 1940. An esteemed cleric, Habib Ali 
was respected by many Indonesian officials and was a close friend of Sukarno, 
the first Indonesian president. Due to his eminence, when Habib Ali died in 
1968, thousands of people came to pay their respects (Mauladawilah 2009, 
2010; Alhabsyi 2010; AY 2013).
The description sketched above is only a small example of Arab and 
Indo-Arab figures who contributed to the shaping of Islamic scholarship and the 
spread of Islam in Indonesia. There were also non-Hadrami scholars, teachers 
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and preachers who contributed to the introduction and proliferation of Islam. 
They were also some leading figures of Arab descent who made significant 
contributions to subjects like art, politics, economy, business and education. 
Considered the first modern artist from Indonesia (Dutch East Indies), Raden 
Saleh Sjarif Boestaman (1811–1880) was one of the noted figures in these 
areas. Born in Semarang into a notable Hadrami family (his father was Sayyid 
Hussein bin Alwi bin Yahya), he was a pioneering Indonesian Romantic painter 
of Arab-Javanese ethnicity, whose paintings corresponded with the 19th-
century Romanticism that was popular in Europe at the time. Raden Saleh's 
interest in art began in Bogor when he studied under the Belgian artist A. J. 
Payen, who recognised his talent and persuaded the Dutch to send him to the 
Netherlands to study art under the great 19th-century Dutch artists Cornelius 
Kruseman and Andreas Schelfhout. It was from Kruseman that Raden Saleh 
perfected his skills in portraiture.
One of the famous leading Arab figures in Indonesian politics was 
Abdurrahman Baswedan (1908–1986). Born in Surabaya, Baswedan was 
a political leader, journalist, writer, nationalist, anti-colonial activist and 
diplomat, involved in numerous political activities and a member of several 
political parties and organisations. He also served as Deputy Minister of 
Information of the Third Sjahrir Cabinet, a member of Indonesian parliament, 
member of Constitutional Assembly, and was one of Indonesia's first 
diplomats involved in successfully lobbying international political leaders 
and governments to grant political recognition to the newly independent 
Republic of Indonesia. In 1934, he gathered young Indo-Arabs in a congress 
in Semarang, leading to the declaration of a Youth Pledge for Indonesian 
Arabs that proclaimed Indonesia as their motherland and supported Indonesian 
freedom from colonisers. Not only leading the congress, he also chaired the 
Indonesian Arab Party, founded in 1939, a political body for Indonesian Arabs 
aimed at mobilising Indo-Arabs in support of a national movement, helping 
struggle for Indonesia's independence, and providing a political body for 
Indonesian Arabs (de Jonge 2004: 237–400; Al Gadri 1988).  
In recent Indonesian history, there are also numerous notable Indo-Arabs, 
both religious and secular, who have helped to define Indonesian politics, 
economy, education and general culture. Unfortunately, due to limited space, 
I cannot mention them all. Among the prominent contemporary figures of 
Arab or Hadrami origins are Ali Alatas, former Minister of Foreign Affairs in 
Suharto's New Order era; Muhammad Quraish Shihab, a noted Islamic scholar 
and a Qur'anic exegete; Alwi Shihab, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and 
a special envoy for the Middle East; Said Aqil Husein Al Munawar, former 
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Minister of Religious Affairs; Salim Segaf Al-Jufri, former Minister of Social 
Affairs; Haidar Bagir, entrepreneur, philanthropist, author and educator; 
Haddad Alwi, a Nasheed singer; Ahmad Albar, a rock singer; Najwa Shihab, 
a TV presenter; Anis Baswedan, former Minister of Education and Culture 
and the respected clerics and preachers Habib Muhammad Luthfi bin Yahya, 
Habib Umar bin Hafidz, Habib Munzir bin Fuad Al-Musawa, Habib Hasan bin 
Ja'far Assegaf, and Habib Syech Abdul Qadir Assegaf, among many others.
It is important to observe that the notable figures of Arab origins have not 
only lived in Jakarta but also in the many Arab districts throughout the country, 
including in Bogor, Semarang, Cirebon, Solo, Tegal, Surabaya, Pontianak and 
Ambon, among others. Due to their significant roles and contributions to the 
religious and non-religious (economy, politics, culture) spheres alike, as well 
as the mantle many, but not all, carry as being a descendent of the Prophet 
Muhammad (PBUH), Indonesian Muslims have generally paid respect to 
this group. Most Indonesian Muslims do not understand and are not able to 
distinguish between sadah and non-sadah groups. It is true that some Arab 
or Indo-Arab figures have been involved in practices or actions that offended 
Indonesian society at large, such as past cooperation with the colonialists or 
their contemporary involvement in corruption, (as in the case of Said Aqil 
Husein Al Munawar) but these "individual issues" generally do not have a 
negative effect on the image of Indonesians of Arab descent. What are the 
factors, then, that damage the image the rest of Indonesian society holds of 
this group?  
INDO-ARABS AND THE NEGATIVE IMAGE OF THE ARAB 
WORLD: CONTEMPORARY NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 
POLITICS
There are at least five factors that have contributed to the turn towards a 
negative portrayal of Arab or Indo-Arab communities in Indonesia and more 
contentious relations with the rest of society. 
The first factor is the practice of temporary marriage in some parts of 
West Java, attributed to (mostly foreign) Arab men and Indonesian women, 
especially from the Sundanese ethnic group. The practice of kawin kontrak 
("temporary" or "contract" marriage) as it is widely known nowadays, 
between Arab men and Sundanese women, has become a subject of public 
knowledge and discourse. News about this issue has been disseminated 
across the country primarily by print and virtual media reports of activities 
and information, including the locations of the centres of temporary marriage 
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activities in regions such as Cisarua, Cipanas, Ciawi, Badong, and Bogor in 
West Java, collectively known as Puncak (hilltop), because the villas, hotels, 
or hostels where these activities take place are mainly located in the highlands 
or mountains.7
Since the public assumption is that these activities mainly involve 
Arabs, these areas have become known as Kampung Arab. However, unlike 
the Kampung Arab that have existed since the European colonial era, the 
ones in the Puncak are a relatively new phenomenon. Local people refer to 
them as Kampung Arab not because Arabs have settled for many years in the 
areas, but because many Arab tourists stay in hotels and villas there, and to 
accommodate them, many signs are written in Arabic and many businesses 
employ workers who can speak both Bahasa Indonesia and Arabic. Restaurants 
and minimarkets sell Arab or Middle Eastern foods, drinks, and other goods 
typical in the Arab regions such as sisha (tobacco), and the interiors and 
furniture of villas, hotels, and restaurants are designed in a Middle Eastern 
style. All of this is designed to make Arab tourists more comfortable during 
their stay in the area.8 Local workers in the Arab-style minimarkets whom I 
interviewed during my fieldwork in these areas said that some "Arab stuffs" 
are directly imported from some countries in the Middle East, while others are 
produced in Jakarta or West Java, to minimise costs.9 
The wave of Arab tourists from the Middle East has caused several 
consequences, both positive and negative. For businesses, this is an 
opportunity to create a variety of operations, while for local people in the 
area, it has involved an increased momentum in informal economies, such as 
motorcycle taxis, tourism guides, part-time security, laundries and others. For 
local prostitutes, who are mainly of Sundanese background, Arab tourists are 
a rejeki nomplok (windfall) of high-paying customers. Local informants told 
me that most prostitutes who service the tourists and the women and girls who 
engage in the temporary marriages with the Arab men are from neighbouring 
villages and regencies in West Java, not from the local area. Temporary 
marriages and other forms of sexual activities between Arab tourists and local 
women lead to problems as well, including sexually transmitted diseases 
and unclear status of children resulting from temporary marriage, since the 
Indonesian government only recognises marriages as legal when they are 
in accordance with the Indonesian marriage laws and children born to these 
relationships, whom the local people call anak jadah or anak haram (unlawful 
child), are considered to be born out of illegal sexual relationships, outside a 
legal marriage and hence ineligible for access to social services and public 
schools. 
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These practices have also contributed to the shape of destructive images 
about Arabs and Indo-Arabs, as well as Indonesian society in general. In 
2006, some 70 women's organisations, including Fatayat of Nahdlatul Ulama, 
Institut Ungu, Kalyanamitra, and Srikandi Demokrasi Indonesia, held a press 
conference in Jakarta to address the phenomena of the sex industry in West 
Java. A group of Kaukus Perempuan (female legislators) also organised 
several meetings with the government to speak out about these issues, which 
they considered a shame for nilai-nilai ketimuran (Eastern values) and a 
disgrace to Indonesian culture. Moreover, the female activists and legislators 
defined temporary marriages as no more than pelacuran terselubung (veiled 
prostitution), and identified the need to address the practice as a serious 
problem.  
According to Maria Arga Nita, a psychologist who conducted fieldwork 
on this issue in West Java, the pervasive practices of kawin kontrak with 
Arabs, as well as of prostitution among Sundanese women are strongly linked 
with the habits of Sundanese culture and habits, where it is easy to have sex 
with a stranger and individuals are reluctant to do hard work to make money. 
Nita said, "the characteristics of Sundanese women are that they want to 
live comfortably but are too lazy to do hard work; therefore prostitution is 
their solution."10 Moreover, female journalist Mariana Amiruddin argued that 
the phenomena of kawin kontrak is a syndrome of a "Cinderella Complex" 
(quoted in Lesmana 2011: 233–234), namely that women from poor families 
are willing to get married to Arabs, even temporarily, hoping that by this 
marriage they will produce handsome and beautiful children with brighter and 
better futures than their parents. Jakarta-based Jurnal Perempuan (Woman 
Journal) documented the kawin kontrak practices in a documentary film, titled 
Don't Buy Don't Sell.11  
As noted earlier, despite bringing some benefits for local people, the 
practice of contract marriage and the sex industry in West Java have cultivated 
a damaging image, of both Indonesians and the Arabs and Indo-Arabs who 
refuse such practices. In other words, the behaviours of some Arab tourists 
are responsible for creating harmful portrayals of other good foreign Arabs 
of the Middle East, and of Indo-Arabs who have settled in the archipelago 
for centuries, as well as the general Indonesian population. Although some 
Arab tourists do believe that the practice of temporary marriage, either in the 
form of nikah mut'ah (contract/temporary marriage) or nikah misyar (tourism 
marriage), is religiously legitimate (Lesmana 2011: 232–244), Muslims 
and Indonesians in general consider these practices a form of prostitution.12 
Indonesian law also does not recognise contract marriage. Although many 
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have condemned contract marriage and the sex industry, it is difficult to end 
these practices, since there are syndicates behind them that included connected 
local government, security forces, the police, business, politicians, preman 
(gangsters), mucikari (pimps) and so on, all of which are united by the desire 
for money.13
A second factor is the involvement of some Arab and Indo-Arab leaders 
in various cases of communal violence, intolerant actions, and anti-pluralist 
movements in the aftermath of the fall of Suharto's dictatorial government 
in 1998, after he spent 32 years in power. Indonesia has witnessed dramatic 
shifts, both for bad and for good. On one hand, Indonesian citizens' freedom 
to express their political wants and desires is guaranteed by the law and 
Constitution. On the other hand, however, undemocratic, anti-pluralist civilian 
groups, including, but not limited to, radical conservative Muslim groups, have 
also grown in some parts of the country, as one result of relatively unchecked 
civil liberties. The seeds of post-Suharto-era Islamic radicalism, among other 
things, were planted by radical conservative Muslim clerics, many of whom 
are devout followers of Salafi teachings, through madrasah (Islamic schools), 
pesantren (Islamic boarding schools), and clandestine gatherings. 
Some Arab and Indo-Arab leaders have contributed to these violent 
and intolerant actions. They include such notorious figures as Ja'far Umar 
Thalib, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, Habib Rizieq Shihab, Habib Salim Selon, Habib 
Hussain Al-Habsyi, Salim Mubarak Attamimi, and Habib Ahmad bin Zain 
Al Kaff, among many others. Of Hadrami descent, Ja'far Umar Thalib is the 
founder of Laskar Jihad, a Java-based holy war paramilitary group that played 
an important role in exacerbating Christian–Muslim violence in Maluku 
between 1999 and 2004. A veteran of the Afghan War, Thalib led thousands of 
jihadists from Java to Ambon City, the provincial capital of Maluku in eastern 
Indonesia, to battle against Christian fighters. He was not alone in this effort. 
Other Indo-Arab leaders from Maluku, including Muhammad (Mo) Attamimi, 
Salim Basoan, and Umar Ali Attamimi, also joined the Laskar Jihad and battled 
fiercely against Christians of Maluku (Al Qurtuby 2016). 
Furthermore, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, co-founder of the Jamaah Islamiyah, 
dubbed by the U.S. government as Southeast Asia's terrorist hub, and leader of 
the Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid, has been charged by the Indonesian authorities 
for his involvement in several bloody terrorist incidents around the country. 
In Solo, Central Java, Ba'asyir founded an Islamic boarding school, named 
Pesantren Ngruki, which teaches a strict, conservative form of Islam. Some 
perpetrators of terrorism and activists of jihadist groups in Indonesia have 
been linked to this Pesantren. Habib Rizieq Shihab and Habib Salim Selon 
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are the leaders of the Islamic Defender Front. Habib Hussain Al-Habsyi is 
the leader of Ikhwanul Muslimin Indonesia. Habib Ahmad bin Zain Al Kaff 
is the chairman of Majelis Syura Aliansi Nasional Anti Syiah, an Indonesian 
national alliance of anti-Shia factions. Moreover, Salim Mubarak Attamimi 
(or Abu Jandal), recently deceased, was an activist of the Islamic State of Iraq 
and Syria (ISIS). A resident of Malang, East Java, of Arab-Hadrami decent, 
Attamimi has attracted much attention since he appeared on YouTube in June 
2014, claiming to be the Indonesian leader of ISIS and calling on Indonesian 
Muslims to join the terrorist group and wage jihad against the Iraqi and Syrian 
regimes.14 
Of all the above radical-Islamist organisations, the Islamic Defender 
Front (or "Front Pembela Islam"; hereafter FPI) is the most notorious. The 
Laskar Jihad was disbanded following the Bali bombings in 2002 and its 
members dispersed, some choosing to remain in Ambon and surrounding 
regions, while others headed back to Java. Its members were believed to have 
been pacified, although some of them may have joined other Islamist groups 
in the country. The terrorist group Jama'ah Islamiyah also faded away due to 
the loss of Muslim support and the Indonesian government's ruthless treatment 
of terrorists. FPI remains powerful, with branches in many provinces and 
districts across the country. In some areas, such as Central Java, Maluku and 
Kalimantan (with the exception of Pontianak), the organisation has lost the 
support from local Muslims. However, in other regions (West Java, Banten, and 
Jakarta, among others), it has gained support from some local Muslim groups. 
FPI was inaugurated on 17 August 1998, just three months after Suharto's 
fall from power, by Muhammad Rizieq Shihab (known as Habib Rizieq) and 
several other radical-conservative Muslim leaders, mostly of Hadrami Arab 
descent. Its initial aims were twofold: (1) to fight against the plague of drugs, 
pornography, gambling, and prostitution which it deemed maksiat (vices) and 
public immorality; and (2) to respond to suspected human rights transgressions 
against Muslims15 (Jahroni 2008). 
Since FPI was founded in 1998, its members and activists are often 
found in the headlines of mass media for intimidation and violent acts against 
civilians, religious sects, and minority groups (both non-Muslims and Muslims) 
in major cities and small towns across the country. FPI's mandate amr ma'ruf 
nahi munkar" (commanding right and forbidding wrong) is derived from its 
understanding of Qur'anic injunctions (see Sura Luqman (31), verse 17, for 
instance), but it has moved beyond its initial objectives, now no longer only 
combating what it considers to be a vice, but also battling against Christian 
evangelicals and non-conformist Muslim groups it carelessly dubs as deviant, 
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sacrilegious, liberal and infidel. Such "infidel" groups include Ahmadiyah, 
Shia, Salamullah, Satariyah, al-Qiyadah, Liberal Islam Network and Gafatar, 
among many others. 
Still, while exploiting public moral anxieties about vice and immorality, 
FPI has challenged pro-democracy students, anti-extremist government 
officials, pro-peace religious leaders, progressive scholars, human rights 
activists, and defenders of Muslim tolerance and religious pluralism from 
both state and social arenas. Of all local religious sects and belief-systems, 
the Ahmadiyah and Shia communities probably have suffered the most: their 
mosques have been razed, their offices plundered, and their followers expelled 
from their homes, making them refugees in their own country. Survey results 
from various research centres and academic institutions, including the Wahid 
Institute, the Maarif Institute for Culture and Humanity, and Gadjah Mada 
University's Center for Religious and Cross-Cultural Studies, have placed FPI 
on the top of their lists of perpetrators of religious violence, extremism, and 
anti-tolerance and pluralism in post-Suharto Indonesia. 
FPI's brutality has indeed met with widespread criticism and peaceful 
resistance from various groups and individuals throughout the archipelago, 
including ordinary local villagers and townspeople, academics, grassroots 
activists, interfaith practitioners, pro-democracy leaders, and the country's 
moderate Islamic organisations, such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and 
Muhammadiyah. Organisations and networks opposed to anti-FPI and other 
extremist-Islamist organisations have been created on Facebook and other 
social media as expressions of citizens' anger, worry and disagreement with 
these radical groups. From time to time, NU uses its youth militia wing, the 
Banser, to protect churches and holy sites of other religious minorities from 
FPI attacks. Recently, this has happened in the regions of Cirebon, Yogyakarta, 
Semarang, Solo, and many places in East Java. Outside Java, in Kalimantan 
and Sulawesi, local governments, adat (customary law) chiefs, traditional 
leaders, NGO activists, and college students have all also challenged FPI's 
intimidation and anti-pluralist acts.
Religious leaders of NU (e.g., KH Said Aqiel Siradj, known as Kiai 
Said) and of Muhammadiyah (e.g., Muhammad Syafii Ma'arif, known as Buya 
Syafii) frequently take stands against the positions of the commanders of FPI 
(e.g., Habib Rizieq and Habib Selon) concerning various controversial issues 
from religious pluralism and minority rights to the permissibility of Christmas 
greetings and local regulations based explicitly on Islamic Sharia (known as 
Perda Syariat).16 While Kiai Said and Buya Syafii represent the defenders of 
peaceful and tolerant Islam, Habib Rizieq and Habib Selon are leaders of a 
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violent and intolerant Islam. Kiai Said and Buya Syafii argue that the minority 
rights of Indonesian citizens, including their rights to express their religious 
beliefs, should be defended, as mandated by the Indonesian Constitution and 
the Qur'an. The two religious leaders also demand that every Indonesian citizen 
be understood as equal, no matter what their faith or ethnicity. In contrast, 
Habib Rizieq and Habib Selon argue that Muslims, since they are the majority 
in Indonesia, must be prioritised by the government. Whereas Kiai Said and 
Buya Syafii disagree with the implementation of the Perda Syariat, Habib 
Rizieq and Habib Selon support the Perda. Currently, Kiai Said and Buya 
Syafii have expressed no concerns about the candidacy of Basuki Tjahaja 
Purnama (known as Ahok), a Christian, for Governor of Jakarta. Habib Rizieq, 
however, is fiercely against Ahok, and mobilises masses to reject him.17 The 
criticism and disagreement between the two opposing groups has been widely 
spread throughout many media.  
Notwithstanding the pervasive popular resistance, disparagement and 
condemnation, FPI's intolerant and violent actions continue to persist. Efforts, 
including collecting signatures and endorsements from a diverse network of 
societies and associations or campaigns of a million of support from Facebook 
and Twitter users, have been made demanding to have FPI disbanded and 
close down its offices and centres, but the paramilitary group has not come 
to an end. Many people point fingers at certain high-ranking bureaucrats and 
politicians, as well as some elite members in the police and military, who 
seemingly approve of and benefit from FPI's destructive deeds. It seems that 
no Muslim political elites in the country want to lose support from Muslims in 
elections by standing up for the interests of religious minorities, risking being 
labelled un-Islamic or foes of Muslims. Instead of condemning FPI's brutality, 
an increasing number of Muslim leaders have denounced the Ahmadiyah, 
Shiites and other local sects as deviant religious groups, referring to fatwa 
(Islamic edicts) issued by the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) and the 
Islamic Community Forum (FUI). 
 It is thus obvious that the rise and persistence of FPI and other anti-
pluralist and intolerant religious groups is not simply driven by the group's 
founders' dissatisfaction with the country's law enforcement, or as a response 
toward the state's weakness, as some analysts have observed, but rather that 
the group's existence is the fruit of mutual collaboration between anti-pluralist 
and intolerant factions in both the government and society, military and civilian 
alike. In other words, the emergence of FPI and similar groups is the product of 
synergy, to borrow the terms of Robert Hefner (2001), between uncivil states 
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and uncivil society. The phenomenon of FPI on the Indonesian political stage 
also mirrors the pattern of the old political-religious coalitions to run society. 
Indonesia's Blasphemy Law18 provides further legal legitimacy for the 
vigilante actions of FPI. As Melissa Crouch (2012: 1–2) has observed, this 
law casts a bleak outlook for deviant groups, "leaving religious minorities 
vulnerable to convictions for blasphemy and the risk of violence in the 
future." Together, these structures have formed an image of FPI members 
as happy hooligans, cloaking themselves in religious dress. In contrast to 
FPI's claims that it acts on behalf of restoring public order and morality, FPI 
rampages have made the public arena more chaotic and insecure. Their vicious 
and vandalistic activities, more importantly, have done great harm to the image 
of Indonesia and Indonesian Islam internationally, as well as to that of Arabs 
and Indo-Arabs more specifically. 
The third factor that has contributed to damage the image of Arabs 
in Indonesia is the widely publicised news of maltreatment of Indonesian 
housemaids and menial labourers by some Arab employers in the Middle 
East, which has generated mass protests and public criticism against Arabs. 
The Indonesian government first agreed to formally allow Indonesian workers 
to be recruited to the Middle East in 1983. In the first year, approximately 
47,000 fully documented laborers left Indonesia to Arab regions, mostly to 
the Gulf, and this number grew rapidly every year thereafter. The majority of 
this migrant group between 1984 and 1999 were women, almost all of them 
intending to work as domestic workers. These statistics do not include the 
undocumented workers that left as well. 
Silvey (2004: 145–146) has shown that migrant domestic workers in 
the Middle East have faced a range of problems. First, domestic service jobs 
are unregulated and come with no legal protections. Nor are they protected 
by state regulation or monitoring by the Indonesian government agencies. 
Second, popular and state-supported understandings of the domestic sphere 
as a private space make exploitation and abuse more difficult to expose than 
if it took place in the public wage-earning sphere. Third, the many migrants 
who overstay their work visas or migrate without complete documentation 
are ineligible for even the minimal state protections that would be available to 
them if they held regular contract work visas in a regulated employment sector. 
Undocumented migrants' stateless status makes them particularly vulnerable 
to abuse by both middlemen and employers. Indeed, there have been media 
reports of migrants who were overworked, underpaid and forbidden to leave 
the homes of their employers, and also of ones who died mysterious deaths. As 
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such cases gained widespread attention, public resistance to women's overseas 
migration intensified (Silvey 2004, 2006, 2007). The Indonesian government 
also responded to these hostile cases by stopping dispatch of housemaids and 
menial workers to certain Arab countries, particularly in the Gulf. Although 
the situation is now more stable, the public memory of this domestic violence 
has not gone away. People still express their hate and insolence against Arabs 
in social media, seminars, and other public means. 
The fourth factor is the vulgar proselytisation, Islamisation and 
Arabisation attempted by some Indonesian alumni of universities, schools, or 
Islamic centres in the Middle East or their Indonesian branches. It is imperative 
to emphasise that not all graduates of these institutions participated in harsh 
Islamic evangelisation and intolerant, violent da'wah (proselytisation). In 
fact, there are Arab universities and graduate schools of Islamic studies that 
teach tolerance and pluralism, and spread a peaceful form of Islam. Equally 
important, some alumni of Indian and Pakistani schools have also spread a 
strict form of Islam. Those who urge such harsh Islamisation of Indonesia 
and purification of local traditions and cultures have primarily been trained 
in the Middle East, in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Sudan and Yemen, among others. 
The Islamic studies alumni use media, campuses, schools, mosques, public 
sermons, and other means to spread puritanical, reformist forms of Islam that 
do not practice tolerance of local cultures, traditions and religious practices and 
symbols. There are hundreds of cases of religious campaigns with powerful 
anti-local culture or tradition themes, initiated by these alumni and their 
networks. Such cases often generate opposition to the Arabs and Arab Islam.
The fifth factor that contributed to the damage of the Arab image in 
Indonesia is the ongoing violent conflicts, acts of terrorism, and the social-
political disarray in some Arab countries, such as Iraq, Yemen, Egypt, Libya 
and Syria. The carnage, terrorism and war in these Middle Eastern countries 
have spread a negative image of Arab culture and reputation. The barbaric 
acts committed by some radical religious militias and terrorist groups have 
contributed to the decline of Arab image in contemporary Indonesia. Many 
Indonesians have stood against the bloodshed and condemned the terrorists 
and the extremists since they worry about the diffusion and transmission of 
their violence into Indonesian society. The concern and fear of Indonesians 
towards the Arab influence can be understood in part as the result of the fact 
that some Arab, Indo-Arab or Arab-influenced Indonesian Muslim elites have 
publicly declared their support to (or even affiliation with) violent terrorist 
groups in the Middle East, such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, Hamas, 
or Jabhat al-Nusra, which they considered to be the "true Islamic groups" that 
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struggle for Islam and for Muslim societies. Although actors or ethnic groups 
involved in violence in the Middle East vary, including not only Arabs but also 
Kurds, Persians, Turks, and so forth, most Indonesians equate the Middle East 
with Arabs. It can therefore be understood why most Indonesians portray the 
Middle Eastern conflict as Arab conflict, a conflation that contributes to the 
worsening reputation of Arabs in contemporary Indonesia. 
CONCLUSION: TOWARDS A MORE MULTICULTURAL 
INDONESIA
The descriptions and analyses outlined above suggest that the history of Arabs 
in Indonesia began long before the influence European colonialism, although 
there were a great number of Arab migrants in the 19th century and onwards. 
The social relations between the Arabs and other Indonesians have been 
dynamic, marked by conflict and tensions, as well as by peace and harmony. 
The presence of Arabs and Indo-Arabs has received multiple responses in the 
local societies they inhabit. Some Indonesian societies greatly appreciate their 
presence, stating that the Arabs could help introduce a true form of Islam for 
local Muslims. Others, in contrast, respond negatively, noting that the Arabs 
are an asocial group, stingy people, troublemakers and destroyers of local 
traditions and customs. 
In recent years, particularly since the collapse of Suharto dictatorial 
regime in May 1998, perceptions of Arab and Indo-Arab communities by 
Indonesian Muslims have changed. In the past, Indonesian Muslims generally 
tended to hold Arabs and Indo-Arabs in high esteem, because of the positive 
roles played by respected haba'ib and ulama of Arab origins (both sadah and 
non-sadah). However, after the fall of Suharto, there have been shifts among 
Indonesian Muslims regarding their support, opinions and perceptions towards 
Arabs and Indo-Arabs, both positive and negative. As mentioned before, there 
were several factors and rationales that contributed to this shift. It should be 
noted that the change is not linear since there has been a plurality of responses 
among Indonesian Muslims towards the Arab and Indo-Arab groups.   
Some Indonesian Muslims still give their support to the Arabs and 
admire Arab Islam, which they consider to be the true and pristine Islam. 
Even though some radical, Islamist Arab and Indo-Arab clerics and leaders 
propagated, initiated and led campaigns aimed at destroying local Indonesian 
cultures in the name of "true Islam," these Indonesian Muslims follow their 
paths, sometimes becoming "foot soldiers" of the Arabs and Indo-Arabs, since 
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they believe that religious Islam is more important than secular customs. 
Others, especially the nationalists, moderates, liberals, nominal Muslims, 
and non-Muslims, denounce and blame the Arabs and their local Indonesian 
networks and counterparts as being the root causes of sporadic acts of intra- 
and interreligious clashes, religious intolerance, and anti-pluralist movements, 
as well as of the destruction of local traditions, symbols and cultures inherited 
by the country's leluhur (forbearers). They also accuse the Arabs and Indo-
Arabs of being a threat to Indonesia's national ideology, Pancasila and motto, 
Bhineka Tunggal Ika (Unity in Diversity), which serve as the political, 
historical, and cultural foundations for Indonesia's integrity, heterogeneity, 
and tolerance-in-pluralism. 
Another group of Muslims—particularly members of NU, Indonesia's 
largest Muslim social organisation, followers of thariqah (Sufi orders), and 
some urban piety Muslim groups—give their support to peaceful, tolerant 
Arab and Indo-Arab clerics while denouncing extremists. Famous Arab 
clerics and preachers, such as Habib Muhammad Lutfi bin Yahya, the supreme 
spiritual leader of Jam'iyah Ahl al-Thariqah al-Mu'tabarah al-Nahdliyyah (an 
association of Sufi groups linked to NU), and Habib Sjech bin Abdul Qadir 
Assegaf, a well-known charismatic preacher, are among figures who teach 
a peaceful, tolerant Islam that has won the hearts of many Muslims in the 
country. Urban middle class Muslims and academic circles have been drawn 
to Habib Muhammad Quraish Shihab, another leading contemporary Islamic 
scholar of Arab origins, a prolific writer on Islam, and an expert of tafsir al-
Qur'an (Qur'anic exegesis, who advocates the idea of peace, tolerance and 
human brotherhood. His daughter, Najwa Shihab, a famous TV presenter, has 
also gained popularity from the Indonesian public due to her sharp criticism 
against corrupt members of the government, military, parliament and so forth. 
Another noted contemporary figure of Arab origins is Anies Baswedan, a 
former Minister of Culture and Education. 
These various examples stand as evidence that there have been diverse 
responses from Indonesians towards Arab and Indo-Arab communities. As 
a result, social relations between Arabs and Indo-Arabs and other parts of 
Indonesian society have been unstable, dynamic and fluid. As long as the 
Indonesian government and society can manage differences, conflicts and 
tensions between these two groups wisely, democratically and productively, 
they will not result in communal violence. However, if both state and society 
fail to address this crucial issue, Indonesia's history of intergroup violence will 
recur in the future.
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1 This is not only true of Islam. Contemporary Indonesia has also been marked by the 
growth of U.S.-linked evangelical and Pentecostal Christianity, as well as the appearance 
of the Syrian Orthodox Church. 
2 For example, Christian Snouck Hurgronje (1857–1936), a noted Dutch scholar of 
oriental cultures and languages and advisor on native affairs to the colonial government 
of the Netherlands East Indies, even gave recommendations to the Dutch administration 
concerning the role of the Arabs in the colony.
3 Ba 'Alawi means "descendants of 'Alawi." Ba is a Hadrami dialect from Arabic 
"bani," meaning "offspring." It is vital to notice that the 'Alawi family differs from the 
Alawiyyin, a term used to describe the progeny of Hasan and Husain, both sons of Ali 
bin Abi Thalib. All people of Ba 'Alawi are 'Alawiyyin, but not all people of 'Alawiyyin 
family are Ba 'Alawi (Al-Mansyur 2010). 
4 Ahmad bin Isa, whose tomb remains a popular pilgrimage site for Hadramis, first 
migrated from Basrah, Iraq, to Hadramaut in the southern part of present-day Yemen 
in the year 952, aiming at avoiding sectarian violence, including the invasion of the 
Qaramite forces into the Abbasid Caliphate.
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5 The naming of this mosque by local Muslims was in reference to Habib Ahmad bin 
Hamzah's habit of i'tikaf (sitting quietly in a mosque while reciting verses or any 
[Arabic] sentences aimed at remembering God and reflecting his creatures) in the 
corner of this mosque.
6 In response to the anti-colonial Banten War of 1888, for instance, Sayyid Uthman 
declared that any call to jihad (Holy War) against the colonialists and non-Muslim 
rulers to be haram (forbidden by Islamic law) because it could be an aberration (ghurur) 
to the true Islamic teachings (Kartodirdjo 1966, 1973). Another reason for his refusal to 
sanction holy war against the Dutch was to maintain law and order, security, and socio-
political stability.
7 In the summer of 2016, I spent a few days visiting these areas and have conversations 
with the locals. 
8 See http://www.merdeka.com/peristiwa/kawasan-puncak-manjakan-turis-arab.html. 
Accessed 20 February 2016.
9 Interviews took place in Bogor, 1–2 June 2016.
10 Online interviews with Maria Arga Nita, 22 February 2016. The interviews were 
conducted in Bahasa Indonesia. I translated the interviews into English.  
11 Quoted from Lesmana (2011: 232–234).
12 Some Arabs whom I had conversations with said there are multiple opinions concerning 
the concepts of nikah misyar and nikah mut'ah. Some said that the ideas are religiously 
legal, and that therefore, such temporary marriages are halal (lawful); while others 
considered such types of marriage to be inappropriate (cf. Lesmana 2011: 232–244).
13 Online interview with Maria Arga Nita, 22 February 2016. 
14 On the news of Salim Mubarak Attamimi see, among others, http://www.tribunnews.
com/regional/2014/08/13/salim-panglima-isis-asli-arek-malang. Accessed 1 April 
2015.
15 According to Jajang Jahroni (2008), the FPI founders claimed that the desire to 
assist Muslim victims of human rights infringement was driven by the failure of the 
government and democracy activists in protecting their rights. Up to this day FPI 
has indeed accused prodemocracy elements, interfaith activists, progressive-minded 
scholars, and liberal Non-governmental organisations (including those run by Muslims), 
among others, as Christian-Western-biased and anti-Islam. 
16 Perda Syariat is Regional Law that is built based on the interpretations of particular 
Islamic texts in the Qur'an, Hadith, or aqwal (sayings or opinions) of classical ulama 
(Islamic scholars) and fuqaha (jurists).   
17 Concerning FPI's opinions on religious-social issues in Indonesia can be viewed at its 
website www.fpi.or.id.
18 The Blasphemy Law or "Undang-Undang Penistaan Agama" describes the collective 
legislation, presidential decrees, or ministerial directives that prohibit blasphemy in 
Indonesia. One of the examples of the Blasphemy Law is the Presidential Decree No. 1/
PNPS/1965 on the Prevention of Blasphemy and Abuse of Religion. The decree inserted 
Article 156 (a) into the nation's Criminal Code that targets those who deliberately, in 
public, express feelings of hostility, hatred, or contempt against religions with the 
purpose of preventing others from adhering to any religion, and targets those who 
disgrace religion. 
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